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PRECLUSION CONCERNS AS AN ADDITIONAL FACTOR
WHEN STAYING A FEDERAL SUIT IN DEFERENCE
TO A CONCURRENT STATE PROCEEDING
INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court has defined the abstention doctrines' as narrow
exceptions to the "virtually unflagging obligation of the federal courts to
exercise the jurisdiction given them."2 In Colorado River Water Conser-
vation District v. United States,3 the Court dismissed a case that was also
the subject of parallel state court proceedings.4 Although the Court in
that case identified congressional authority warranting the decision not
to exercise its jurisdiction,5 lower federal courts have dismissed and
1. The abstention doctrines permit a federal district court to decline or postpone the
exercise of jurisdiction in deference to anticipated or pending state proceedings concern-
ing the matter. See Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S.
800, 813-14 (1976); C. Wright, The Law of Federal Courts § 52, at 302-03 (4th ed. 1983)
[hereinafter cited as C. Wright I]. For a discussion of each doctrine see infra note 9. This
note focuses entirely on Colorado River abstention, which permits a federal court to defer
to a similar pending state action. See Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 817-21. Although the
Court in Colorado River stated that the dismissal was not granted pursuant to any of the
abstention doctrines, see id. at 817, courts and commentators have identified the proce-
dure as a fourth abstention doctrine. See Chemical Bank v. City of Bandon, 562 F. Supp.
704, 706 (D. Or. 1983); 17 C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and
Procedure § 4247, at 502 (1978) [hereinafter cited as C. Wright II]; Ashman, Alfini &
Shapiro, Federal Abstention: New Perspectives on Its Current Vitality, 46 Miss. LJ. 629,
631-32 (1975). But see United States v. Bluewater-Toltec Irrigation Dist., 580 F. Supp.
1434, 1443 (D.N.M. 1984) (exceptional circumstances test is not based on principles of
abstention but merely on conservation of judicial resources).
2. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817
(1976); see Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe, 103 S. Ct. 3201, 3216 (1983) (quoting
Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 817); Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr.
Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1983) (same)i Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 437 U.S. 655, 664
(1978) (plurality opinion) (same); id. at 673 (Brennan, J., dissenting in 4-1-4 plurality
opinion) (same); Kaholokula v. Hula Records, Inc., 746 F.2d 583, 585 (9th Cir. 1984)
(same); American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Edward D. Stone, Jr. & Assoc., 743 F.2d 1519,
1525 (11th Cir. 1984) (same); Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 740
F.2d 566, 569 (7th Cir. 1984) (same). See generally C. Wright I, supra note 1, §§ 52,
52A, at 302-30 (discussing four distinguishable abstention doctrines); J. Nowak, R. Ro-
tunda & J. Young, Handbook on Constitutional Law 99-109 (2d. ed. 1983) (discussing
abstention doctrines) [hereinafter cited as J. Nowak].
3. 424 U.S. 800 (1976).
4. See id. at 819-21.
5. See Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 819. The Court stated that of the factors counsel-
ling for the dismissal "the most important" was the congressional policy evident in the
McCarran Amendment, ch. 651, Title II, § 208(a), 66 Stat. 560, 560 (codified at 43
U.S.C. § 666 (1982)). See Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 819; accord Moses H. Cone Memo-
rial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 16 (1983) (Court in Colorado River
recognized Congress' judgment that disputes were intended to be adjudicated in state
court); Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 437 U.S. 655, 673 0977) (Brennan, J., dissenting in
4-1-4 decision) (without federal congressional policy comparable to that identified in Col-
orado River, stay is inappropriate). See infra notes 36-37 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the McCarran Amendment.
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stayed cases without such authority.6
Using the doctrine in the absence of legislative approval raises difficult
questions concerning both the principle of separation of powers and the
plaintiff's right to a federal forum.7 This Note examines the conflict be-
6. See, e.g., Microsoftware Computer Sys., Inc. v. Ontel Corp., 686 F.2d 531, 537-38
(7th Cir. 1982) (wasteful duplicative effort and no peculiarly federal interest favoring
exercise of jurisdiction); Dinzik v. Hanson Galleries, 553 F. Supp. 547, 549 (S.D. Tex.
1982) (mem.) (unique factors favoring retention could not be identified); Klingenberg v.
Bobbin Publications, Inc., 530 F. Supp. 173, 174 (D.D.C. 1982) (no compulsion to exer-
cise jurisdiction if state court proceeding is more expeditious); Bagley v. Florida First
Nat'l Bank, 508 F. Supp. 11, 12-13 (M.D. Fla. 1980) (avoidance of wasteful litigation);
see also McKnight v. Blanchard, 667 F.2d 477, 479 (5th Cir. 1982) (court has discretion
to stay proceedings in interest of controlling docket but may not do so indefinitely);
Clarkson Co. v. Shaheen, 544 F.2d 624, 629 (2d Cir. 1976) (court has power to stay case
to avoid wasteful duplicative litigation but power not to be exercised unless cases similar);
Thompson v. Kerr, 555 F. Supp. 1090, 1098-99 (S.D. Ohio 1982) (same). But see Roberts
& Schaefer Co. v. Lake Coal Co., No. 83-5551, slip op. at 4 (6th Cir. Nov. 20, 1984)
(insufficient showing to warrant departure from rule obliging federal court to exercise
jurisdiction), cert. granted, 105 S. Ct. 1841 (1985); Vaccaro v. Lew, 82 F.R.D. 455, 461
(E.D.N.Y. 1979) (mem.) (same); Kraftsman Container Corp. v. Finkelstein, 461 F. Supp.
245, 252-53 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (mem.) (same).
Some courts have distinguished between a dismissal of jurisdiction and a mere stay.
See Augustin v. Mughal, 521 F.2d 1215, 1217 (8th Cir. 1975); Weiner v. Shearson, Ham-
mill & Co., 521 F.2d 817, 821 (9th Cir. 1975). However, this distinction is artificial.
When a federal court grants a stay the expectation is that the state court will resolve the
entire controversy and that the plaintiff will be barred from returning to federal court by
res judicata principles. See Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp.,
460 U.S. 1, 10 (1983); C. Wright I, supra note 1, § 52, at 317-18. Thus, the effect of a stay
and a dismissal is the same: a plaintiff is unable to litigate federal claims in a federal
forum. See infra notes 76-78 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 60-63 and accompanying text. Compare Arizona v. San Carlos
Apache Tribe, 463 U.S. 545, 569 (1983) (application of Congress' jurisdictional policies
underlying McCarran Amendment counselled for dismissal) and Colorado River Water
Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 820 (1976) (same) with Moses H. Cone
Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 20, 24 (1983) (refusal to abstain
because of liberal congressional policy favoring arbitration agreements although result
was piecemeal resolution). See Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228, 234-37 (1943)
(absent exceptional circumstances, stay thwarts purpose of jurisdictional act); Burford v.
Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 344-48 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (not defensible for
Court to abrogate jurisdiction when Congress has persistently refused to restrict such
jurisdiction); Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 789-90 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(Edwards, J., concurring) (when Congress has made determination that plaintiff can sue
in federal court only Congress is authorized to decide whether those actions should not
be heard), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1354 (1985). Recently commentators have questioned
the abstention doctrines on the basis of separation of powers. See Redish, Abstention,
Separation of Powers, and the Limits of the Judicial Function, 94 Yale L.J. 71, 76 (1984)
[hereinafter cited as Redish I]; Note, Judicial Abstention and Exclusive Federal Jurisdic-
tion: A Reconciliation, 67 Cornell L. Rev. 219, 219 (1981) (separation of powers concerns
in context of exclusive jurisdiction) [hereinafter cited as Judicial Abstention].
The Supreme Court has been aware of the implications of separation of powers princi-
ples on the exercise of federal jurisdiction in contexts other than abstention. See, e.g., J.1.
Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433 (1964) (federal court must carefully consider
whether it should imply a cause of action and exercise jurisdiction in order to provide
remedy consistent with congressional purpose); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino,
376 U.S. 398, 423 (1964) (separation of powers requires nonexercise of jurisdiction when
exercise would infringe executive branch's foreign affairs powers); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.
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tween Colorado River abstention and congressional enactment of jurisdic-
tional statutes, and recommends that courts consider res judicata
principles when determining the propriety of a stay.
I. DENIAL OF FEDERAL JURISDICTION IN DEFERENCE TO PENDING
STATE PROCEEDINGS
Although the federal courts have acknowledged an obligation to hear
cases,' they have also recognized the power to abstain9 in "exceptional
186, 217 (1962) (separation of powers requires nonexercise of jurisdiction when exercise
implicates political question).
8. Fair Assessment in Real Estate Ass'n v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100, 117 (1981) (Bren-
nan, J., concurring); Alabama Public Serv. Comm'n v. Southern Ry., 341 U.S. 341, 355
(1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Willcox v. Consolidated Gas Co., 212 U.S. 19, 40
(1909). See supra notes 2, infra note 61 and accompanying text.
9. There are three traditional abstention doctrines permitting federal courts to de-
cline or postpone the exercise of their jurisdiction in deference to anticipated or pending
state proceedings. See Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424
U.S. 800, 813-14 (1976).
The first category, identified as Pullman abstention, applies "in cases presenting a fed-
eral constitutional issue which might be mooted or presented in a different posture by a
state court determination of pertinent state law." County of Allegheny v. Frank
Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185, 189 (1959); see Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167, 176-77
(1959); Leiter Minerals, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 220, 228-29 (1957); City of Chi-
cago v. Fieldcrest Dairies, Inc., 316 U.S. 168, 171-72 (1942); Railroad Comm'n v. Pull-
man Co., 312 U.S. 496, 498 (1941). See generally L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law
§ 3-40, at 150-52 (1978) (discussing Pullman doctrine); C. Wright I, supra note 1, § 52, at
303-07 (same); Field, Abstention in Constitutional Cases" The Scope of the Pullman Ab-
stention Doctrine, 122 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1071 (1974) (same); Redish I, supra note 7, at 95-96
(same). The parties are ordered to resolve the state law issues in state court only if the
state statute is capable of two constructions-one which renders the law unconstitutional
and the other which renders it constitutional. Accordingly, abstention is inappropriate if
the meaning of the state law is settled. Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 814-15; see, eg.,
Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 64-69 (1972); City of Chicago v. Atchison T. & S.F. Ry.,
357 U.S. 77, 84 (1958); C. Wright I, supra note 1, § 52, at 304; Note, Federal Court Stays
and Dismissals in Deference to Parallel State Court Proceedings: The Impact of Colorado
River, 44 U. Chi. L. Rev. 641, 649 (1977) [hereinafter cited as The Impact of Colorado
River].
Pullman abstention does not result in the abdication of jurisdiction; it merely delays
the exercise of that jurisdiction. The plaintiff is not required to submit his federal claims
to the state court, but may instead reserve these contentions until returning to the federal
court following the state adjudication. England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Exam-
iners, 375 U.S. 411, 415-17 (1964); see American Trial Lawyers Ass'n v. New Jersey Sup.
Ct., 409 U.S. 467, 469 (1973) (per curiam); Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167, 177
(1959); Government & Civic Employees Org. Comm. v. Windsor, 353 U.S. 364, 366
(1957). But see Harris County Comm'rs v. Moore, 420 U.S. 77, 88-89 & n.14 (1975)
(dismissal of federal claims without prejudice is appropriate when state court will refuse
to hear only state law claims while plaintiff reserves federal claims); Romero v. CoIdwell,
455 F.2d 1163, 1167 (5th Cir. 1972) (same). The doctrine, however, is not without its
detractors. It is thought to cause undue delay in the enforcement of federal rights, see J.
Nowak, supra note 2, at 102; C. Wright I, supra note 1, § 52, at 305-06; Field, supra, at
1130, to employ state courts as advisors or research assistants to the federal courts, see
United Servs. Life Ins. Co. v. Delaney, 396 S.W.2d 855, 859, 863 (Tex. 1965); C. Wright
I, supra note 1, § 52, at 307, and to waste judicial effort in determining whether the state
statute is sufficiently ambiguous to abstain, see Redish I, supra note 7, at 95.
A second abstention doctrine, recognized in Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315
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(1943), requires a federal court to dismiss a case involving an area of traditional state
power when the exercise of federal jurisdiction would have a disruptive effect on "state
efforts to establish a coherent policy with respect to a matter of substantial public con-
cern." Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 814; see Burford, 319 U.S. at 326-27; see, e.g., Kaiser
Steel Corp. v. W.S. Ranch Co., 391 U.S. 593, 594 (1968) (per curiam) (water rights);
Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 28-29 (1959) (eminent
domain condemnation proceedings); Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Southern Ry., 341
U.S. 341, 344 (1951) (intrastate railroad regulation); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Sabbagh, 603
F.2d 228, 233 (1st Cir. 1979) (auto insurance rates). To invoke the doctrine state law
must be unsettled and the matter must bear on a substantial state policy. See Colorado
River, 424 U.S. at 815. Compare Louisiana Power, 360 U.S. at 29-30 (abstention permit.
ted when issues involving state's eminent domain powers were unsettled) with County of
Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185, 187 (1959) (abstention not permitted
when issues involving state's eminent domain powers were well settled).
The third abstention doctrine was first utilized in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37
(1971), and prohibits a federal court from enjoining ongoing state criminal proceedings
even when federal constitutional claims are alleged. See id. at 46-47; Colorado River, 424
U.S. at 816. The Younger Court ruled that although federal courts should not hesitate to
vindicate federal rights, they should do so in ways that will not interfere with legitimate
state activities. See 401 U.S. at 44. These principles also apply to state civil proceedings
when the state is a party to the proceeding and the matter is closely related to a criminal
statute. See, eg., Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 444 (1977) (civil attachment ac-
tion brought by the state); Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 333-35 (1977) (judicial contempt
proceedings); Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 604 (1975) (state's interest in nui-
sance litigation is as great as in criminal proceeding). For a general discussion of the
Younger abstention doctrine see generally J. Nowak, supra note 2, at 106-09; C. Wright I,
supra note 1, § 52A.
The Supreme Court has stated that the difficulty of ascertaining state law is not a
sufficient ground for a court to decline to exercise its jurisdiction. See Meredith v. Winter
Haven, 320 U.S. 228, 234-35 (1943). Subsequent decisions of the Court, however, have
cast doubt on this proposition, and the difficulty of ascertaining state law has been consid-
ered another ground for abstention. See C. Wright I, supra note 1, § 52, at 308-09, 312
(comparing County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185 (1959), where
dismissal was not permitted because state law was settled, with Louisiana Power & Light
Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25 (1959), where dismissal was ordered because state
law was unsettled). The Court has affirmed the Meredith rule, see McNeese v. Board of
Educ., 373 U.S. 668, 673 n.5 (1963), but has endorsed a certification procedure which can
be used to obtain a judgment from a state's highest court on an unsettled state issue, see
Lehman Brothers v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 389-90, 392 (1974), and has stated in dictum
that "unclear issues are commonly split off and referred to state courts," see Pennhurst
State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 104 S. Ct. 900, 920 (1984).
In addition to the abstention doctrines, the Supreme Court has recognized several
other limited exceptions to the general rule that a federal court must exercise its properly
invoked jurisdiction. The doctrine of forum non conveniens permits dismissal of an ac-
tion to a more convenient forum or when public policy demands the dismissal. Piper
Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 257-61 (1981); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S.
501, 507-09 (1947). Typically the alternative forum is a federal court, and dismissal of
one action does not impinge on the plaintiff's right of access to a federal forum. It is
possible, however, that the only alternative forum might be a state court. The change of
venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1982), has eliminated this problem, see C. Wright I,
supra note 1, § 52, at 315 n. 62, as has the reluctance of courts to invoke the doctrine
when a plaintiff would be relegated to a state court, see Burns v. Adam, 114 F. Supp. 355,
356 (E.D. Pa. 1953); The Impact of Colorado River, supra, at 647-48. How this doctrine
affects a court's obligation to exercise jurisdiction is beyond the scope of this Note.
When a state court has already taken jurisdiction of a res, a federal court must decline
the exercise of jurisdiction. Princess Lida v. Thompson, 305 U.S. 456, 466 (1939). Juris-
diction of the property is said to vest the state court with exclusive jurisdiction to deter-
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circumstances." 1 The federal judiciary has been too eager to overlook
this obligation, however, and frequently declines to exercise jurisdiction
when a similar proceeding is pending in state court."
mine all related controversies. United States v. Bank of New York & Trust Co., 296 U.S.
463, 477-78 (1936). The rule is justified by principles of federalism: It is better to avoid
friction with state tribunals which could result from simultaneous exercise of jurisdiction
over the same res. Taylor v. Carryl, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 583, 595 (1858).
A federal court may also decline the exercise of its jurisdiction to hear a declaratory
judgment when a similar state suit is pending. Brilhiart v. Excess Ins. Co. of Am., 316
U.S. 491, 494-95 (1942). The dismissal in Brillhart, however, was based on the Court's
discretionary power to exercise the equitable jurisdiction granted in the Declaratory
Judgment Act. See Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 437 U.S. 655, 670-72 (1978) (Brennan,
J., dissenting); 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1982).
Finally, a federal court can stay an action where the same issues are present in another
action pending in another federal court. Kerotest Mfg. Co. v. C-O-Two Fire Equip. Co.,
342 U.S. 180, 181, 184 (1952); Exxon Corp. v. United States Dep't of Energy, 594 F.
Supp. 84, 89-90 (D. Del. 1984).
The prudential standing doctrine is another example of an instance in which a federal
court may decline the exercise of its properly invoked jurisdiction. C. Wright 1, supra
note 1, § 13, at 70-74. However, it is beyond the scope of this Note to discuss the manner
in which that doctrine affects a court's obligation to exercise its jurisdiction.
10. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 14 (1983)
(quoting Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 813
(1976) (quoting County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185, 188-89
(1959))); see Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228, 234 (1943). In Meredith, the
Court explained that abstention was proper only in the exceptional circumstances in
which "some recognized public policy or defined principle guiding the exercise of the
jurisdiction conferred" could be identified. Id. The requirement of "exceptional circum-
stances" has been repeated in subsequent abstention decisions. See, e.g., Arizona v. San
Carlos Apache Tribe, 463 U.S. 545, 572 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting); id. at 580 (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting); Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 14; Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 813;
Harris County Comm'rs Ct. v. Moore, 420 U.S. 77, 83 (1975); Kusper v. Pontikes, 414
U.S. 51, 54 (1973); Lake Carriers Ass'n v. MacMullan, 406 U.S. 498, 510-11 (1972);
Reetz v. Bozanich, 397 U.S. 82, 86 (1970); Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 248 (1967);
Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 375 (1964); County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co.,
360 U.S. 185, 188-89 (1959); Propper v. Clark, 337 U.S. 472, 492 (1949); Illinois Bell Tel.
Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 740 F.2d 566, 569 (7th Cir. 1984); Giardina v.
Fontana, 733 F.2d 1047, 1052 (2d Cir. 1984); Forehand v. First Ala. Bank, 727 F.2d
1033, 1035 (11th Cir. 1984); West v. Village of Morrisville, 728 F.2d 130, 135 (2d Cir.
1984); Note, Stays of Federal Proceedings in Deference to Concurrently Pending State
Court Suits, 60 Colum. L. Rev. 684, 687-88 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Pending State
Court Suits]; The Impact of Colorado River, supra note 9, at 642. But see Will v. Calvert
Fire Ins. Co., 437 U.S. 655, 663-64 (1978) (plurality opinion) (plurality recognized that as
cases of duplicative litigation in state and federal courts increase, it would be appropriate
at discretion of district courts to defer).
11. See, e.g., Microsoftware Computer Sys., Inc. v. Ontel Corp., 686 F.2d 531, 537-38
(7th Cir. 1982) (court did not consider exceptional circumstances); Giulini v. Blessing,
654 F.2d 189, 193-94 (2d Cir. 1981) (avoid waste of duplicative litigation); Calvert Fire
Ins. Co. v. American Mut. Reinsurance Co., 600 F.2d 1228, 1233 (7th Cir. 1979) (prevent
duplicative litigation); Dinzik v. Hanson Galleries, 553 F. Supp. 547, 549 (S.D. Tex.
1982) (action should be stayed unless unique factors favor retention of jurisdiction);
Klingenberg v. Bobbin Publications, Inc., 530 F. Supp. 173, 174 (D.D.C. 1982) (stay
permitted even when federal law applies); Kistler Instrumente A.G. v. PCB Piezotronics,
Inc., 419 F. Supp. 120, 123-24 (W.D.N.Y. 1976) (decision to stay case for docket control
purposes is left to sound discretion of court); see also McKnight v. Blanchard, 667 F.2d
477, 479 (5th Cir. 1982) (control of docket and interests of justice are sufficient reasons
1985] 1187
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A. Declining the Exercise of Jurisdiction
The duty to exercise jurisdiction is implicated when a plaintiff is forced
to litigate his claims in state court because a federal court has invoked
one of the abstention doctrines. 2 Under section 1738 of the Judicial
Code,13 federal courts must give state court judgments the same preclu-
sive effect that those judgments receive in the courts of the state from
which they emanate."4 Indeed, not only are federal issues actually liti-
gated in a state case barred in a subsequent federal action, but issues
which could have been raised but were not are also precluded.' 5
Application of this res judicata principle in the abstention context sub-
stantially limits a litigant's right to federal court adjudication of his en-
for stay, but duration must be reasonable). But see Tovar v. Billmeyer, 609 F.2d 1291,
1293 (9th Cir. 1979) (conflicting adjudications, piecemeal litigation and duplication of
judicial efforts are unavoidable costs of preserving access to a federal forum).
12. Migra v. Warren City School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 104 S. Ct. 892, 898 & n.7 (1984);
Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 10 (1983); Colo-
rado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 813 (1976); Kusper
v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 55 (1973); England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examin-
ers, 375 U.S. 411, 415 (1964); West v. Village of Morrisville, 728 F.2d 130, 135 (2d Cir.
1984). See also infra note 60 and accompanying text.
13. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1982) provides that state judicial proceedings "shall have the
same full faith and credit in every court within the United States. . . as they have by law
or usage in the courts of such State. . . from which they are taken." The statute has
been referred to as the "full faith and credit statute," see Marrese v. American Academy
of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 105 S. Ct. 1327, 1331 (1985), and the statutory counterpart to
art. IV, § 1 of the United States Constitution, see Migra v. Warren City School Dist. Bd.
of Educ., 104 S. Ct. 892, 896 (1984).
14. See Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 105 S. Ct. 1327,
1331-32 (1985); Migra v. Warren City School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 104 S. Ct. 892, 896
(1984); Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 481-82 (1982); Allen v. Mc-
Curry, 449 U.S. 90, 96 (1980).
This rule requires that the federal courts examine the relevant state res judicata law
before determining whether the federal action is precluded. See Marrese, 105 S. Ct. at
1332; Migra, 104 S. Ct. at 896. Although the federal courts are directed to apply state res
judicata principles, which of course may vary, the Court has used certain terminology to
explain its decisions. See Marrese, 105 S. Ct. at 1329 n.1; Migra, 104 S. Ct. at 894 n.1.
Res judicata consists of two concepts, issue preclusion and claim preclusion, that impose
limits on the relitigation of issues adversely decided in a final judgment. See Parklane
Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326-27 & n.5 (1979); 1B J. Moore, J. Lucas & T.
Currier, Moore's Federal Practice 0.405[l], at 178-80, 178 n.1 (2d ed. 1948) [hereinafter
cited as J. Moore]. Issue preclusion, or collateral estoppel, refers to the effect of a judg-
ment in foreclosing relitigation of a particular issue decided in a previous action. Id.
0.441[2], at 722-30; see Marrese, 105 S. Ct. at 1329 n. 1;Migra, 104 S. Ct. at 894 n. 1. See
generally F. James & G. Hazard, Civil Procedure tit. 11.22-.31, at 575-99 (2d ed. 1977)
(discussion of issue preclusion). Claim preclusion refers to the effect of a judgment in
foreclosing relitigation of a matter previously litigated or, if not previously litigated,
which could have been advanced in an earlier suit. 1B J. Moore, supra, S 0.405[l], at
178-82; see Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394-95 (1981). See generally
F. James & J. Hazard, supra, tit. 11.6-.21, at 536-75 (discussion of claim preclusion).
15. Migra v. Warren City School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 104 S. Ct. 892, 897-98 (1984);
see 1B J. Moore, supra note 14, 0.405[l], at 179, 181. See supra note 14. But see
Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 105 S. Ct. 1327, 1333 (1985)
(claim preclusion not applicable when plaintiff unable to rely on a theory of his case
because of limitations on court's subject matter jurisdiction).
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tire civil action.16 Therefore, abstention has been permitted only in the
exceptional circumstances in which Congress has expressly relaxed the
obligation to exercise jurisdiction17 or when a recognized public policy
capable of supporting an implication of such congressional authority can
be identified."8 The Court has stated that abstention can be justified
16. See Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 10, 28
(1983); England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 414-15 & n.5
(1964); Ultracashmere House, Ltd. v. Meyer, 664 F.2d 1176, 1183-84 (1Ith Cir. 1981);
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Haydu, 637 F.2d 391, 397 (5th Cir. 1981);
C. Wright H, supra, note 1, § 4247 at 517-19; The Impact of Colorado River, supra note
9, at 641 & n.1.
In Burford abstention it is clear that the entire case is left for state court adjudication
with no possibility for a return to federal court, see Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n v.
Southern Ry., 341 U.S. 341, 348-49 (1951); Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 332
(1943); C. Wright II, supra note 1, § 4245, at 490-91; see also England, 375 U.S. at 415 &
n.5 (relegating a plaintiff to state court is objectionable in Pullman abstention but not in
Burford abstention), except through Supreme Court review of a decision from the state's
highest court, see 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1982). In Younger abstention the state criminal
proceedings will effectively bar any relitigation of federal constitutional claims in a subse-
quent federal action for civil damages. See Allen v. MeCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 95-96 (1980).
In Pullman abstention the fact that the adjudication of state law issues might preclude
subsequent litigation of federal issues in a federal forum led the Court in England to
develop a procedure whereby a plaintiff is permitted to reserve the federal claims. See 375
U.S. at 421-22 (1964); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 427-28 (1963).
17. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 819
(1976); see Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 20 &
n.22 (1983) (Court identified a jurisdictional statute giving express congressional author-
ity for expeditious federal adjudication); Redish I, supra note 7, at 78, 81 (courts should
not decline jurisdiction absent statutory authority). Congress, in the interest of federal-
ism, has dictated federal court abstention in certain cases. See, eg., The Tax Injunction
Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982); The Johnson Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1342 (1982); 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(b) (1982); The Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1982); The Three-Judge
Court Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2284 (1982). These acts constitute express legislative limits on
the exercise of federal judicial power. There is little reason to suspect that Congress
intended additional limits to be self-imposed by the judiciary. Arguably, however, if
Congress was unhappy with the abstention doctrines it could revoke them. The failure to
do so, combined with the re-enactment of the relevant jurisdictional legislation may re-
veal an implicit congressional acceptance and ratification of the judge-made abstention
doctrines. See Redish I, supra note 7, at 81 (positing this argument only to attack it).
For an excellent criticism of the argument, see id. at 80-84 (Congress has not deferred to
judicial discretion in this area; theory condones through legislative inertia what is initially
a judicial usurpation of legislative authority; Congress is too busy to have to change the
law every time it disagrees with an incorrect judicial interpretation of a statute).
18. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43 (1971) (inferring power to dismiss case
from congressional history of permitting state courts to try state cases free from federal
interference); Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 332-33 (1943) (implying that court
should temper exercise of its equitable powers before Congress imposed rigorous restric-
tions on those powers to further federal harmony) (quoting Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman
Co., 312 U.S. 496, 501 (1941)). Professor Redish argues that it is conceivable but highly
unlikely that Congress would impliedly delegate to the judiciary the authority to modify a
jurisdictional grant when necessary to avoid friction within the federal system. See Red-
ish I, supra note 7, at 78, 80. It has also been suggested that the power of the federal
courts to fill in the interstices of a statutory act empower it to modify the jurisdictional
grants when Congress can be said not to have intended otherwise. See Gulf Oil Corp. v.
Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 515 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting). The Court has made a consider-
able effort to identify recognizable public policies supporting abstention in order to justify
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"only in the exceptional circumstances where the order . . . would
clearly serve an important countervailing interest."' 9 The abstention
cases have confined these "important countervailing interest[s]" to the
recognized policies of federalism, comity and proper constitutional adju-
dication." Because congressional authority for the decision not to exer-
cise jurisdiction can be inferred from these policies, the principle of
separation of powers and the right of a plaintiff to a federal forum have
not been compromised. 1
A federal court should not, however, abstain solely because an in per-
an implication of congressional authority for the procedure. See Meredith v. Winter Ha-
ven, 320 U.S. 228, 234 (1943). See infra note 20 and accompanying text.
19. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 813
(1976) (quoting County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185, 188-89
(1959)).
20. Both Burford and Younger abstention are supported by federalist principles. In
Burford abstention it is thought appropriate, in a dual judicial system, to defer to sensi-
tive, complex and independent state administrative programs and policies of substantial
public import. See Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S.
800, 814-15 (1976); Bezanson, Abstention: The Supreme Court and Allocation of Judicial
Power, 27 Vand. L. Rev. 1107, 1123 (1974); Note, Abstention: An Exercise in Federalism,
108 U. Pa. L. Rev. 226, 230 (1976). In Younger abstention it is considered important to
leave state courts free to perform their separate functions, especially when the state at-
tempts to enforce its own penal statutes. See Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 332-33 (1977);
Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 600-01 (1975); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44
(197 1). The Younger abstention doctrine is also said to be justified as an exercise of the
court's equitable powers. Because the federal plaintiff could raise his claims in the state
proceeding there is an adequate remedy at law and no need for the federal court to exer-
cise its equitable powers. See Juidice, 430 U.S. at 336-37; Younger, 401 U.S. at 43-44.
Pullman abstention is supported by two recognized policies. First, it is thought best to
avoid unnecessary constitutional adjudication. See Lake Carriers Ass'n v. MacMullan,
406 U.S. 498, 511 (1972) (citing Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528, 534 (1965)); Rail-
road Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 498 (1941). Second, it is thought to be
appropriate to respect the independence of state governments and to avoid hasty interpre-
tations of unsettled state law. Pullman, 312 U.S. at 500.
A recent Supreme Court decision may have an interesting impact on the abstention
doctrines that are based on federalist principles. In Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit
Auth., 105 S. Ct. 1005 (1985), the Court stated: "the principal means chosen by the
Framers to ensure the role of the States in the federal system lies in the structure of the
Federal Government itself. . . . [T]he composition of the Federal Government was
designed in large part to protect the States from overreaching by Congress." Id. at 1018.
The Court argued that "the principal and basic limit on the federal commerce power is
that inherent in all congressional action-the built-in restraints that our system provides
through state participation in federal governmental action." Id. at 1020. The argument
is equally forceful with respect to Congress' power to enact jurisdictional statutes. The
principal limit on that power is state participation in the federal system. Accordingly, the
judiciary should not concern itself with creating federalism doctrines which "invit[e] an
unelected federal judiciary to make decisions about which state policies it favors and
which. . . it dislikes." Id. at 1015. It is not the role of the judiciary to invoke federalist
concepts to modify congressional enactments; Congress is the appropriate forum for con-
sideration of these principles. Indeed, Congress has demonstrated its ability to accommo-
date state interests through the enactment of statutes preventing the federal judiciary
from unnecessarily intruding on the jurisdiction of the state courts. See supra note 17 and
accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 60-70 and accompanying text.
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sonam action has been filed in state court.' Ordinarily there is no ex-
press congressional authority permitting abstention in such a case and
there are no identifiable public policies capable of supporting an implica-
tion of such congressional authority.23 Nevertheless, lower federal
courts, seeking to exercise greater control over their dockets, have cast
doubt on this proposition.24 Finding a pattern of authority running
through recognized doctrines permitting dismissals, these courts have
held that the mere pendency of a similar state proceeding is sufficient to
invoke abstention. 5 The inefficiency of duplicative litigation was re-
garded as sufficiently exceptional to warrant dismissal of the federal
action.26
22. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817
(1976); see Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 15
(1983); Donovan v. City of Dallas, 377 U.S. 408, 412-13 (1964); Kline v. Burke Constr.
Co., 260 U.S. 226, 230 (1922); Home Depot, Inc. v. Louisiana, 589 F. Supp. 1258, 1262
(E.D. La. 1984); Agristor Leasing v. Kjergaard, 582 F. Supp. 39, 40 (D. Minn. 1983); cf.
Thermtron Prods., Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336, 344 (1976) (case properly re-
moved cannot be remanded to state court for purposes of docket control).
23. See Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 819
(1976) (dismissal permitted because case presented rare instance in which express con-
gressional authorization was found). The policies underlying Younger and Burford ab-
stention, see supra note 20, are ordinarily not present in a case.
24. See, e.g., Weiner v. Shearson, Hamill, & Co., 521 F.2d 817, 819-21 (9th Cir.
1975); PPG Indus. v. Continental Oil Co., 478 F.2d 674, 679-81 (5th Cir. 1973);
Reichman v. Pittsburgh Nat'l Bank, 465 F.2d 16, 18 (3d Cir. 1972); Weber v. Consumers
Digest, Inc., 440 F.2d 729, 732 (7th Cir. 1971); Amdur v. Lizars, 372 F.2d 103, 106-08
(4th Cir. 1967); Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Adkins, 330 F.2d 595, 601-02 (9th Cir. 1964);
Chronicle Publishing Co. v. NBC, 294 F.2d 744,749 (9th Cir. 1961); P. Beiersdorf & Co.
v. McGohey, 187 F.2d 14, 15 (2d Cir. 1951); id. at 16 (Clark, J., dissenting); Mottolese v.
Kaufman, 176 F.2d 301, 302-03 (2d Cir. 1949); see also Thompson v. Boyle, 417 F.2d
1041, 1042 (5th Cir. 1969) (court states that it is not adhering to stay procedure devel-
oped in other circuits, yet it affirms stay), cerL denied, 397 U.S. 972 (1970).
25. These courts combined a variety of doctrines to justify the finding that they pos-
sess the discretion to dismiss a case in deference to parallel proceedings. In addition to
the abstention doctrines, these courts relied on forum non conveniens, the declaratory
judgment principle, the rule that the first court to control a res exercises jurisdiction to
the exclusion of all others, and the rule that one federal court will defer to a similar action
in another federal court. The aggregate of these rules was interpreted as suggesting that
the obligation to exercise jurisdiction was no longer absolute. See, eg., Weiner v. Shear-
son, Hammill & Co., 521 F.2d 817, 819-21 (9th Cir. 1975) (abstention, declaratory judg-
ment rule, forum non conveniens doctrine); PPG Indus. v. Continental Oil Co., 478 F.2d
674, 679-81 (5th Cir. 1983) (abstention, res exception, declaratory judgment rule); Aetna
State Bank v. Altheimer, 430 F.2d 750, 756 (7th Cir. 1970) (court congestion justifies
abstention), overruled, Calvert Fire Ins. Co. v. Will, 560 F.2d 792, 796 (7th Cir. 1977),
rev'd, 437 U.S. 655 (1978); Amdur v. Lizars, 372 F.2d 103, 106 (4th Cir. 1967) (same)
(quoting Landis v. North Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254-55 (1936)); Mottolese v. Kaufman,
176 F.2d 301, 302-03 (2d Cir. 1949) (abstention, declaratory judgment rule, forum non
conveniens doctrine and doctrine that a federal court should defer to similar action in
another federal court relied upon to justify a stay).
26. See Giulini v. Blessing, 654 F.2d 189, 193-94 (2d Cir. 1981); Amdur v. Lizars, 372
F.2d 103, 106 (4th Cir. 1967); Mottolese v. Kaufman, 176 F.2d 301, 302-03 (2d Cir.
1949); Klingenberg v. Bobbin Publications, 530 F. Supp. 173, 174 (D.D.C. 1982).
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B. Colorado River Abstention and the Obligation to Exercise
Jurisdiction
The Supreme Court in Colorado River27 addressed the propriety of
this conclusion. The United States government filed suit in federal court
seeking a declaration of its rights and those of certain Indian tribes to
waters in the State of Colorado.28 The Colorado Water Conservation
District intervened in the federal action as a defendant and filed a motion
to dismiss the suit in deference to an ongoing state suit in which the
United States had been joined as a defendant. 29 The district court
granted the motion to dismiss the federal suit on abstention grounds.30
On appeal the Tenth Circuit reversed, 31 holding that the United States
was not prevented from litigating its water rights as a plaintiff in a federal
forum by any of the traditional abstention doctrines.3 2
The Supreme Court reversed.3 3 It ruled that although none of the es-
tablished abstention doctrines supported the dismissal, it was nonetheless
proper.34 Noting the general rule that the mere pendency of an in per-
sonam action in state court was no bar to a federal suit,35 the Court
found congressional authority in a statute-the McCarran Amend-
ment 36 -that counselled for deference to comprehensive state procedures
for the adjudication of water rights.37 The Court noted that "considera-
tions of '[w]ise judicial administration, giving regard to conservation of
judicial resources and comprehensive disposition of litigation' " also sup-
ported the dismissal.38 In addition, the Court stated that "[i]n assessing
the appropriateness of dismissal in the event of an exercise of concurrent
27. 424 U.S. 800 (1976).
28. Id. at 803, 805.
29. Id. at 806. The United States had been served in the state proceeding pursuant to
the McCarran Amendment, 43 U.S.C. § 666 (1982), which provides:
Consent is given to join the United States as a defendant in any suit (1) for the
adjudication of rights to the use of water of a river system or other source, or (2)
for the administration of such rights, where it appears that the United States is
the owner of or is in the process of acquiring water rights by appropriation
under State law. . . and the United States is a necessary party to such suit.
30. Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 806 (district court opinion was oral).
31. Id.; see United States v. Akin, 504 F.2d 115, 122 (10th Cir. 1974), rev'd sub nom.
Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976)
32. See Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 806; United States v. Akin, 504 F.2d 115, 122
(10th Cir. 1974), rev'd sub nom. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United
States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976).
33. See Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 806.
34. See id. at 817, 819-21.
35. See id. at 817.
36. 43 U.S.C. § 666 (1982); see Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 819; accord Moses H.
Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 13, 16 (1983); Will v. Cal-
vert Fire Ins. Co., 437 U.S. 655, 673-74 (1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting from a 4-1-4
plurality opinion). See supra note 29 for the text of the McCarran Amendment. See also
supra note 5.
37. See 43 U.S.C. § 666 (1982); Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 819.
38. Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 817 (quoting Kerotest Mfg. Co. v. C-O-Two Fire
Equip. Co., 342 U.S. 180, 183 (1952)).
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jurisdiction, a federal court may .. consider such factors as" which
court first assumed jurisdiction over property, the inconvenience of the
federal forum, the desirability of avoiding piecemeal litigation, and the
order in which jurisdiction was obtained by the concurrent forums. 9
Lower federal courts have relied on this language as an affirmation of
the entrenched practice of staying federal actions merely because of the
pendency of a similar suit in state court.' It can be argued, however,
39. Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 818.
40. See University of Oklahoma Gay People's Union v. Board of Regents, 661 F.2d
858, 860 (10th Cir. 1981); Calvert Fire Ins. Co. v. American Mut. Reinsurance Co., 600
F.2d 1228, 1233-34 (7th Cir. 1979); Heritage Land Co. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Co., 572
F. Supp. 1265, 1266-67 (W.D. Okla. 1983); Dinzik v. Hanson Galleries, 553 F. Supp. 547,
549 (S.D. Tex. 1982); Los Angeles NAACP v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist., 518 F.
Supp. 1053, 1062 (D.C. Cal. 1981), rev'd on other grounds, 714 F.2d 946 (9th Cir. 1983),
cert denied, 104 S. Ct. 2398 (1984); see also Thompson v. Kerr, 555 F. Supp. 1090, 1098-
99 (S.D. Ohio 1982) (recognized, but did not exercise, power to stay because of dissimi-
larities between federal action and pending state suit); cf. Giulini v. Blessing, 654 F.2d
189, 193 (2d Cir. 1981) (cannot dismiss case in deference to parallel proceedings but can
stay); Janmort Leasing, Inc. v. Econo-Car Int'l, Inc., 475 F. Supp. 1282, 1293 (E.D.N.Y.
1979) (power to stay litigation of nonarbitrable claims until conclusion of arbitration).
But see Roberts & Schaefer Co. v. Lake Coal Co., No. 83-5551, slip op. at 4 (6th Cir.
Nov. 20, 1984) (exceptional circumstances amounting to clearest of justifications for not
exercising jurisdiction did not exist), cert. granted, 105 S. Ct. 1841 (1985).
The ease with which stays were permitted suggests lower courts interpreted Colorado
River in light of that Court's quotation of Kerotest Mfg. Co. v. C-0-Two Fire Equipment
Co., 342 U.S. 180, 183 (1952) and Brilihart v. Excess Ins. Co., 316 U.S. 491, 495 (1942).
See Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 817-18. See also supra note 25 and accompanying text.
It is clear, however, that neither of those cases were supportive of the decision to dismiss
in Colorado River. The Kerotest Court was not concerned with the abdication of federal
jurisdiction because the case concerned two parallel federal proceedings. See Kerotest,
342 U.S. at 181, 183; Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 817-18. The Kerotest Court's concern
with the conservation of judicial reources is less important in the context of deferring to a
pending state action because, in the latter case, federalism is implicated. Colorado River,
424 U.S. at 817; Calvert Fire Ins.?Co. v. American Mut. Reinsurance Co., 600 F.2d 1228,
1233-34 (7th Cir. 1979).
In Brillhart, jurisdiction was based upon the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, 28
U.S.C. § 2201 (1982), which empowers federal courts to hear declaratory actions within
their equity jurisdiction. Brillhart, 316 U.S. at 491. The exercise of jurisdiction in such
actions is discretionary, unlike the normal exercise of jurisdiction. Will v. Calvert, 437
U.S. 655, 671-72 (1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Compare 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1982)
("any court of the United States. .. may declare the rights. . . of any interested party
seeking such declaration") (emphasis added) with id, § 1331 ("[t]he district courts shall
have original jurisdiction of all civil actions") (emphasis added). Accordingly, a court is
free to consider docket control in dismissing a declaratory judgment action. Will v. Cal-
vert, 437 U.S. 655, 670-72 (1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
A subsequent Supreme Court decision seemed to modify the "exceptional circum-
stances" test. Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 437 U.S. 655 (1978). In Will the Court
declined to issue a writ of mandamus ordering a district court to reverse its stay order.
The Court stated: the "decision whether to defer to the concurrent jurisdiction of a state
court is, in the last analysis, a matter committed to the District Court's discretion." See
id. at 664, 667-68. The plurality opinion, however, is not persuasive authority for the
propriety of issuing stays because it turned on the propriety of issuing mandamus. See id.
at 657-58. Five Justices agreed the Colorado River "exceptional circumstances" test had
not been abandoned or altered. See Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 437 U.S. 655, 667-68
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that the Court rejected that procedure and has reaffirmed the rule that
only exceptional circumstances support a refusal to exercise jurisdiction.
These courts have ignored the presence of the McCarran Amendment
and its effect on the analytical framework in which Colorado River was
decided.4" It was this amendment that provided the necessary congres-
sional authorization to relax the otherwise unflagging obligation to exer-
cise federal jurisdiction.4" The Court, by acting in accordance with a
legislative directive, remained faithful to the exceptional circumstances
requirement43 and thus to the judiciary's role within the constitutional
scheme of government.'
Similarly, in Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construc-
tion Corp.,45 the Court relied on a federal statute, this time to deny a stay
of a federal proceeding in deference to a state court case.46 In Moses H.
Cone, a hospital and its contractor had agreed to arbitrate disputes aris-
ing during the performance of a contract. After completion of perform-
ance, however, the hospital sued in state court for a declaration that the
contractor did not have a right to arbitration.47 The contractor immedi-
ately sued in federal court to compel arbitration pursuant to the federal
Arbitration Act.4" The hospital then moved to stay the federal proceed-
ing in deference to the ongoing state proceeding.49 The district court
granted the stay"0 but the court of appeals reversed.5" The Supreme
Court held that a stay was inappropriate because the policy of the Arbi-
(1978) (Blackmun, J., concurring); id. at 672-74 (Burger, C.J., and Brennan, Marshall,
Powell, J.J., dissenting).
41. See supra notes 11, 24-26 and accompanying text. See also Will v. Calvert Fire
Ins. Co., 437 U.S. 655, 674 (1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (relying only on four factor
balance test ignores wholesale analytical framework set forth in Colorado River because it
focuses on "secondary factors" supporting dismissal in that case).
42. Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 819. The Court stated: "The clear federal policy
evinced by that legislation is the avoidance of piecemeal adjudication of water rights in a
river system. . . . The. . . jurisdiction given by the McCarran Amendment bespeaks a
policy that recognizes the availability of comprehensive state systems for adjudication of
water rights. . . ." Id. By referring to the congressional policies inherent in the Mc-
Carran Amendment, the Court sought to identify authority for its abdication of jurisdic-
tion. See id.; accord Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S.
1, 16 (1983) (Colorado River recognized that McCarran Amendment represents Con-
gress' judgment that field of water rights is one peculiarly appropriate for comprehensive
treatment in state courts). See also infra notes 61-70 and accompanying text.
43. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
44. See infra notes 62-70 and accompanying text.
45. 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
46. See id. at 20 & n.22, 24, 27 (relevant federal law requires piecemeal adjudication
when necessary to give effect to an arbitration agreement); id. at 24 (Congress declared a
liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements); id. at 27 (Arbitration Act
prescribes summary and speedy procedures).
47. Id. at 4-5, 7.
48. Id. at 7; see 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1982).
49. Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 7.
50. Id. (unpublished district court opinion).
51. Id. at 8; see In re Mercury Constr. Corp. v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp., 656
F.2d 933, 935 (4th Cir. 1981), afl'd, 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
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tration Act was to provide expeditious relief to those seeking to compel
arbitration.52 The Court rejected the contention that exceptional circum-
stances were present, 53 and emphasized that its task was "not to find
some substantial reason for the exercise of federal jurisdiction by the dis-
trict court [but] to ascertain whether there exist. . . the 'clearest of justi-
fications,' [for] the surrender of that jurisdiction. '
Moses H. Cone indicated a desire to curb the practice of deferring to a
pending state suit.55 Indeed, the Court added two factors to be consid-
ered when utilizing the Colorado River test: whether the state forum is
adequate to provide the requested relief and whether federal law provides
the rule of decision on the merits of the case.5 6 However, the Court also
noted that the decision "to dismiss a federal action because of parallel
state-court litigation does not rest on a mechanical checklist."5" Courts
are free to discuss additional factors as long as they consider them in
light of congressional intent.5 8 Nevertheless, the practice of deferring to
pending state suits continues in the lower federal courts;59 the danger
that the rule will be swallowed by the exception persists. Proper respect
for the obligation to exercise federal jurisdiction and its constitutional
underpinnings requires the application of a stricter test before a federal
action is stayed in deference to a state proceeding.
II. AN ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATION: THE PRECLUSIVE EFFECT OF
STATE COURT JUDGMENTS IN SUBSEQUENT FEDERAL
ACTIONS
A. Obligation of the Federal Courts to Exercise Jurisdiction
The federal judiciary has often acknowledged a plaintiff's right to in-
voke federal jurisdiction' and a court's corresponding obligation to exer-
52. See Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 22-23.
53. See id. at 19.
54. Id. at 25-26 (emphasis in original).
55. Redish I, supra note 7, at 97-98; see C. Wright II, supra note 1, § 4247, at 129-30
(Supp. 1983).
56. See Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 23-27; accord Kruse v. Snowshoe Co., 715 F.2d
120, 123 (4th Cir. 1983), cert denied, 104 S. Ct. 1413 (1984); Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v.
Miller, 591 F. Supp. 590, 598 (D. Md. 1984); United States v. Bluewater-Toltec Irrigation
Dist., 580 F. Supp. 1434, 1444 (D.N.M. 1984).
57. Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 16.
58. See Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 437 U.S. 655, 673-74 (1978) (Brennan, J., dis-
senting); Calvert Fire Ins. Co. v. American Mutual Reinsurance Co., 600 F.2d 1228, 1234
(7th Cir. 1979); North Am. Van Lines, Inc. v. State Bd. of Tax Comm'rs, 590 F. Supp.
311, 317-18 (N.D. Ind. 1984).
59. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Bosworth, 713 F.2d 1316, 1321 (7th Cir. 1983); Safeco
Ins. Co. of Am. v. Miller, 591 F. Supp. 590, 597 (D. Md. 1984); Moos v. Wells, 585 F.
Supp. 1348, 1350 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Leaseway Transp. Leasing Corp. v. Berry Indus., 581
F. Supp. 1225, 1227 (N.D. Ga. 1984); North Am. Van Lines, Inc. v. State Bd. of Tax
Comm'rs, 590 F. Supp. 311, 317-19 (N.D. Ind. 1984); Chemical Bank v. City of Bandon,
562 F. Supp. 704, 706-07 (D. Or. 1983); Adams v. Pennsylvania Chiropractic Soc'y, 563
F. Supp. 434, 437 (M.D. Pa. 1983).
60. See, e.g., Lake Carriers' Ass'n v. MacMullan, 406 U.S. 498, 510 (1972) (quoting
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cise that jurisdiction.6 This concept flows from the principle of
separation of powers, which mandates that the federal judiciary abide by
legislative commands, absent a finding of unconstitutionality. 62 This re-
Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 248 (1967)); England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical
Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 415 (1964); Wilcox v. Consolidated Gas Co., 212 U.S. 19, 40
(1909); Korby v. Erickson, 550 F. Supp. 136, 139 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Cottrell v. Virginia
Elec. & Power Co., 363 F. Supp. 692, 696 (E.D. Va. 1973) (quoting Zwickler, 389 U.S. at
248). It is unclear whether the right is statutory, constitutional, or both. However, since
the Supreme Court's decision in Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line
Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982) (plurality opinion), it is arguable that the parties in a federal
forum have a personal constitutional right to have the case determined by article III
judges. Id. at 89-90 (Rehnquist, J., concurring); Pacemaker Diagnostic Clinic of Am. v.
Instromedix, Inc., 725 F.2d 537, 541 (9th Cir.) (en banc) (citing Northern Pipeline), cert.
denied, 105 S. Ct. 100 (1984); Checker Cab Mfg. Co. v. Checker Taxi Co., 26 F.2d 752,
752 (N.D. Ill. 1928). But see Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226, 234 (1922) (a
right which comes into existence only by virtue of congressional act and which may be
withdrawn in the same manner cannot be described as a constitutional right but only as a
statutory right). Some have argued that federal forums are simply superior to state
courts. See England, 375 U.S. at 427 (Douglas, J., concurring) (federal judges appointed
for life are more impartial); Romero v. Weakley, 226 F.2d 399, 401 (9th Cir. 1955)
(same); Redish I, supra note 7, at 73 & n. 15 (arguments that federal courts are superior to
state courts are overwhelming).
61. See England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 415
(1964); Willcox v. Consolidated Gas Co., 212 U.S. 19, 40 (1909). In 1821 the Supreme
Court stated in dictum that a federal court has "no more right to decline the exercise of
jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given. The one or the other
would be treason to the constitution." Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404
(1821); see McClellan v. Carland, 217 U.S. 268, 282 (1910); Chicot County v. Sherwood,
148 U.S. 529, 534 (1893); Hyde v. Stone, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 170, 175 (1857); Giardina v.
Fontana, 733 F.2d 1047, 1053 (2d Cir. 1984); Boe v. Colello, 438 F. Supp. 145, 151-52
(S.D.N.Y. 1977); see also Rohr Indus. v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 720
F.2d 1319, 1324 & n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (noting viability of Cohens dictum from which all
exceptions are carefully carved); Evans v. Tubbe, 657 F.2d 661, 665 (5th Cir. 1981) (must
exercise jurisdiction); Home Depot, Inc. v. Louisiana, 589 F. Supp. 1258, 1262 (E.D. La.
1984) (same). But see C. Wright I, supra note 1, § 52, at 302 (stating that there is no such
rule today); The Impact of Colorado River, supra note 9, at 646-53 (same); Pending State
Court Suits, supra note 16, at 686-93 (same); Vairo, Issuing Stays in Diversity Cases: A
Cure for Growing Congestion?, Nat'l L.J., Feb. 14, 1983, at 22, col. 2 (same).
The rationale for the rule is that the jurisdictional statutes represent congressional pol-
icy determinations concerning the extent to which plaintiffs will be given access to a
federal forum. The courts are obliged by the principle of separation of powers to abide by
those determinations and to adjudicate suits in which a plaintiff satisfies the statutory
jurisdictional requirements. See Lake Carriers' Ass'n v. MacMullan, 406 U.S. 498, 510
(1972) (quoting Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 248 (1967)); England, 375 U.S. at 415;
Cohens, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at 404; see, e.g., Pacemaker Diagnostic Clinic of Am. v. In-
stromedix, Inc., 725 F.2d 537, 541 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 100
(1984); Vickers v. Trainor, 546 F.2d 739, 746 (7th Cir. 1976); Romero v. Weakley, 226
F.2d 399, 401 (9th Cir. 1955); Armour & Co. v. Miller, 91 F.2d 521, 524-25 (8th Cir.
1937); Checker Cab Mfg. Co. v. Checker Taxi Co., 26 F.2d 752, 752 (N.D. Ill. 1928).
But see Butler v. Judge, 116 F.2d 1013, 1015 (9th Cir. 1941) (notwithstanding jurisdic-
tional statute, concurrent proceedings should be stayed); Klingenberg v. Bobbin Publica-
tions, Inc., 530 F. Supp. 173, 174 (D.D.C. 1982) (same); The Impact of Colorado River,
supra note 9, 646-47 & n.37, 665 (same).
62. The framers chose to prevent the tyrannical centralization of power by distribut-
ing powers among three distinct branches of the federal government, each to exercise one
of the governmental powers recognized by the framers as inherently distinctive-legisla-
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quirement is especially important when Congress enacts a jurisdictional
statute.63 The Constitution delegated to Congress the power to ordain
five, executive and judicial. See, e.g., Northern Pipeline Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co.,
458 U.S. 50, 57 (1982); TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194 (1978) (quoting Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)); J. Nowak, supra note 2, at 136; J. Peltason,
Understanding the Constitution 23 (8th ed. 1979); L. Tribe, supra note 9, § 1-2, at 1-4
(1978); The Federalist Nos. 10, 47, 51 (J. Madison) (rev. ed. 1901). Although the framers
established separate departments they did not clearly delineate the functions of each
branch. Instead, the framers established checks and balances between the branches of the
federal government to prevent any department from usurping the powers of the other.
Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 57-58; Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 11-12, 121-22 (1976)
(per curiam); Separation of Powers" Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Separation of Po,
ers of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1967); The Federalist
No. 47, at 271-72 (J. Madison) (rev. ed. 1901); J. Nowak, supra note 2, at 136.
The framers chose to vest in a largely unrepresentative judiciary the power to invali-
date laws adopted by a majoritarian legislature when those laws are deemed violative of
constitutional protections. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. ( Cranch) 137, 176-81 (1803); J.
Nowak, supra note 2, at 5-6. Absent such a finding, however, the judiciary must abide by
legislative enactments. See, eg., California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 297 (1981)
(court cannot graft a remedy on a statute which Congress did not intend to provide);
Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 575 (1979) (same); TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S.
153, 194-95 (1978) (separation of powers requires that "once Congress, exercising its
delegated powers, has decided the order of priorities in a given area, it is for the Executive
to administer the laws and for the courts to enforce them when enforcement is sought")
(emphasis added); Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975) (announcing four factor test to
determine whether court can imply a federal cause of action from a congressional
statute).
63. See Fair Assessment in Real Estate Ass'n v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100, 125-26 (1981)
(Brennan, J., concurring) (jurisdiction is subject to plenary control of Congress and abdi-
cation is inappropriate unless Congress contradicted the presumptive grant of jurisdic-
tional authority); England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411,
415 (1964) (abdication ofjurisdiction is at war with congressional authority); Meredith v.
Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228, 234-35 (1943) (abdication of jurisdiction thwarts purpose of
congressional jurisdictional statute); Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U.S. 182, 187 (1943) (fed-
eral courts derive jurisdiction from congressional authority and therefore are obliged to
adhere to that authority); Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 440, 448 (1850) (same); Cary
v. Curtis, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 236, 245 (1845) (defining and distributing jurisdiction must be
work of legislature); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821) (to decline
exercise of jurisdiction would be treason to constitutional allocation of powers); see also
Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe, 463 U.S. 545, 580 (1983) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(Court carved out unnecessary exception to obligation to exercise jurisdiction based on its
perception of congressional intent); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 515 n.3
(1947) (Black, J., dissenting) (not duty of Court to amend Congress' jurisdictional stat-
utes); Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 336-37, 344-45 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., dis-
senting) (whether theory ofjurisidictional statute is sound is for legislature, not judiciary,
to decide); The Federalist No. 22, at 116 (A. Hamilton) (rev. ed. 1901) ("Laws are a dead
letter without courts to expound and define their true meaning and operation"); id. No.
80, at 444 (A. Hamilton) (national legislature has ample authority to make such excep-
tions connected with inconveniences of incorporating federal jurisdiction into plan of
government); Redish I, supra note 7, at 76 (legislature is proper forum for allocating
jurisdiction); cf. Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 510-12 (1982) (judicially im-
posed requirement of exhaustion of administrative remedies as precondition for maintain-
ing § 1983 action would alter congressional framework for such actions); Aldinger v.
Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 18 (1976) (exercise of pendent party jurisdiction involves question
whether Congress has vested jurisdiction to open federal courts to particular state law
claims against pendent parties). For an illustration of how ajurisdictional statute may be
declared unconstitutional, see McGarry v. City of Bethlehem, 45 F. Supp. 385, 386 (E.D.
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and establish inferior federal courts.' This power has been interpreted
as including the authority to vest these lower courts "with jurisdiction
either limited, concurrent, or exclusive, and [to] withhol[d] jurisdiction
from them in the exact degrees and character which to Congress may
seem proper for the public good."6 Congress has exercised this power
by enacting general jurisdictional statutes giving certain plaintiffs the
right to choose to bring suit in either federal or state court."
Pa. 1942) (amendments to jurisdictional statute entitling citizens of the District of Co-
lumbia to sue in diversity declared unconstitutional). But see 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332 histori-
cal & revision notes (1966) (revised section intended by Congress to permit citizens of
District of Columbia to sue in federal court under the diversity jurisdiction statute); Na-
tional Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 588-89 (1949) (plurality
opinion) (upholding revisions of diversity statute as a legitimate exercise of Congress'
article I powers).
64. U.S. Const. art. III, § 1. This section provides: "The judicial Power of the United
States, shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress
may from time to time ordain and establish." Id. The framers provided for final review of
questions of federal law in the Supreme Court and thereby curtailed the sovereign power
of state judiciaries to make authoritative determinations of law. Garcia v. San Antonio
Metro. Transit Auth., 105 S. Ct. 1005, 1017 (1985). The decision whether to limit further
the sovereign power of state judiciaries by creating inferior federal tribunals was post-
poned. In a heated debate at the Constitutional Convention it was decided that the the
creation of inferior federal tribunals would not be constitutionally required because the
state courts were thought to be capable of handling the anticipated caseload. See I M.
Farrand, The Records of the Federal Convention 104-05, 119 (rev. ed. 1937) (five to four
vote). As a compromise, however, and because it was almost unanimously believed that a
national judiciary would require more than just one supreme tribunal, the framers gave
the national legislature the power to create such inferior federal courts at its discretion.
Id. at 124-25 (eight to two vote); see Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U.S. 182, 187 (1943); Kline
v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226, 234 (1922); Stevenson v. Fain, 195 U.S. 165, 167
(1904); C. Wright I, supra note 1, § 10, at 32-39. Not coincidentally, the first Congress,
which was composed of many of the members present at the Constitutional Convention,
determined that such tribunals were necessary, and exercised the power to create them by
enacting the Judiciary Act of 1789. See Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73. See
generally C. Wright I, supra note 1, § 1, at 4 (discussing history of federal jurisdiction); J.
Nowak, supra note 2, at 23 (same); J. Peltason, supra note 62, at 103, 105 (same); L.
Tribe, supra note 9, § 3-5, at 33 (same).
65. Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U.S. 182, 187 (1943) (quoting Cary v. Curtis, 44 U.S. (3
How.) 236, 245 (1845)); see, eg., Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co., 314 U.S. 118, 129
(1941); Lauf v. E. G. Shinner & Co., 303 U.S. 323, 330 (1938); Kline v. Burke Constr.
Co., 260 U.S. 226, 233-34 (1922); Hallowell v. Commons, 239 U.S. 506, 508-09 (1916);
Kentucky v. Powers, 201 U.S. 1, 24 (1906). The Supreme Court has explained that the
power to define and distribute jurisdiction is incidental to the power to ordain and estab-
lish inferior federal tribunals. See Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 440, 448 (1850). In
Sheldon the Court stated that because the Constitution gave Congress the power to estab-
lish inferior federal courts, one of two consequences must be the result with respect to the
jurisdiction of those courts:
[E]ither. . .each inferior court created by Congress must exercise all the judi-
cial powers not given to the Supreme Court, or. . .Congress, having the power
to establish the courts, must define their respective jurisdictions. The first of
these inferences. . . could not be defended with any show of reason, and...
the latter would seem to follow as a necessary consequence.
Id. at 448.
66. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982) (federal guestion jurisdiction); id. § 1332 (diver-
sity jurisdiction); id. § 1333 (admiralty jurisdiction); id. § 1337 (antitrust jurisdiction).
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The Constitution did not grant Congress this authority without impos-
ing a concomitant duty on the federal courts to adjudicate matters placed
Congress has made numerous specific grants ofjurisdiction in chapter 85 of title 28 of the
United States Code. These specific grants, however, are not exclusive of jurisdiction
granted by other titles of the Code. See J. Moore, Moore's Judicial Code I 0.03(22), at
135-36 (1949). Underlying the general jurisidictional statutes are congressional policy
determinations favoring access to federal courts for the adjudication of certain matters.
See Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 245-48 (1967) (broadening of federal judicial power
was based upon congressional desire to provide plaintiff the choice between state and
federal forum); Microsoftware Computer Sys., Inc. v. Ontel Corp., 686 F.2d 531, 538-39
(7th Cir. 1982) (Doyle, J., dissenting) (creation and exercise of jurisdiction in national
courts serves distinct values); Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power Between United
States and State Courts, 13 Cornell L.Q. 499, 509-30 (1928) (addressing actual and pro-
posed changes in jurisdictional statutes); The Federalist No. 80, at 438, 444 (A. Hamil-
ton) (rev. ed. 1901) (discussing reasons for the creation of a federal judiciary). See supra
note 61.
Congress initially enacted very limited federal question jurisdictional statutes and a
general diversity jurisdictional statute. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73; see C.
Wright I, supra note 1, § 1, at 4, § 23, at 127. Not until 1875 did Congress confer juris-
diction to the outer limits permissible under the Constitution-to cases arising under the
Constitution or laws of the United States. Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 137, 18 Stat. 470; see
C. Wright I, supra note 1, § 1, at 4-6.
There are several reasons for Congress' determination that the federal judicial power
should be expanded to the limits permissible by the Constitution. First, it was thought
necessary to enable a plaintiff to avoid the perceived prejudices of a local forum. See Fair
Assessment in Real Estate Ass'n v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100, 124 n.11 (1981); Middle At-
lantic Utils. Co. v. S.M.W. Dev. Corp., 392 F.2d 380, 386 (2d Cir. 1968); Frankfurter,
supra, at 520; Lusky, Racial Discrimination and the Federal Law: A Problem in Nullifica-
tion, 63 Colum. L. Rev. 1163, 1178 & n.54 (1963). A second reason to expand the federal
judicial power was to deal with local opposition to, or disregard of, the federal law.
Lusky, supra, at 1178 & n.54. One of the primary ways to achieve these goals was to
grant a plaintiff the right to construct a factual record in federal court. It was feared that
federal appellate review of state court litigation would be inadegaute if the factual record
were constructed in a less-than-impartial forum. See Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 437
U.S. 655, 675 (1978) (Brennan, J., dis senting) (access to federal court intended to give
litigants opportunity to take advantage of liberal federal discovery rules and to have im-
partial adjudication of factual disputes); England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Ex-
aminers, 375 U.S. 411, 416-17 (1964) (objectionable to force a plaintiff to litigate in state
court without chance to construct factual record in a federal forum); Dombrowski v.
Pfister, 227 F. Supp. 556, 570 n. 12 (E.D. La. 1964) (Wisdom, J., dissenting) (advantages
of federally constructed record), rev'd, 380 U.S. 479 (1965). A second means of achieving
these goals was to guarantee a plaintiff's access to an impartial forum protected by the
institutional safeguards of article III. See England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical
Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 436 (1964) (Douglas, J., concurring) (im addition to advantages
of constructing factual record in federal court, plaintiff entitled to litigate claims in forum
that is guaranteed to be impartial); Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 790
(D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edward, J., concurring) (congressional intent was to provide alternative
forum to state courts), cerL denied, 105 S. Ct. 1354 (1985); Pacemaker Diagnostic Clinic
of Am. v. Instromedix, Inc., 725 F.2d 537, 541 (9th Cir.) (en bane) (parties to case in
federal forum are entitled to have case determined by article III judges), cert. denied, 105
S. Ct. 100 (1984); Romero v. Wealdey, 226 F.2d 399, 400 (9th Cir. 1955) (right to litigate
in federal court enables plaintiff to choose court presided over by elected or appointed
judge); Kurland, The Constitution and the Tenure of Federal Judges Some Notes from
History, 36 U. Chi. L. Rev. 665, 697-98 (1969) (provisions in article INl, including life
tenure, not created for benefit of judges but for benefit of judged).
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within their jurisdiction.67 To argue otherwise would lead to the untena-
ble conclusion that every substantive right created by Congress could
effectively be subject to a practical veto by a judiciary unwilling to en-
force certain laws.6" A stay or dismissal of federal jurisdiction, therefore,
67. See England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 415
(1964); McClellan v. Carland, 217 U.S. 268, 281 (1910); Willcox v. Consolidated Gas
Co., 212 U.S. 19, 40 (1909); Kurland, Toward a Co-operative Judicial Federalism: The
Federal Court Abstention Doctrine, 24 F.R.D. 481, 489 (1960); Redish I, supra note 7, at
77-79, 112. The constitutional obligation emerges from the principle of separation of
powers, which was designed to give the federal judiciary a considerable amount of inde-
pendence. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 58-60
(plurality opinion),judgment stayed, 459 U.S. 813 (1982); The Federalist No. 78, at 356-
57 (A. Hamilton) (rev. ed. 1901). See supra notes 60-61. However, Congress was given
the power to create, define and distribute the jurisdiction of the federal courts, see Lock-
erty v. Phillips, 319 U.S. 182, 187 (1943); J. Nowak, supra note 2, at 23; C. Wright I,
supra note 1, § 1, at 1-4, as a check on the power of the judiciary, see Cary v. Curtis, 44
U.S. (3 How.) 236, 245 (1845); see also Federalism and the Federal Judiciary: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong.,
1st Sess. 2 (1983) (Congress possesses the check but has not exercised it). The framers
delegated the decision of how to allocate federal jurisdiction to Congress, which was to
make that determination in accordance with the public interest. Lockerty, 319 U.S. at
187; Cary, 44 U.S. (3 How.) at 244; 1 M. Farrand, supra note 64, at 124-25. In effect the
framers postponed the determination whether access to the federal judiciary should be
guaranteed. Instead, that determination was to be made by the representative national
legislature, which was better able to respond to the needs of the public. See supra note 64.
Regardless of whether that decision was made at the Constitutional Convention or in
Congress, however, the judiciary was never intended to be free to ignore the command.
Ordinarily the judiciary does not possess the power to substitute its judgments as to the
proper allocation of jurisdiction for those of either the framers or the Congress. See Lake
Carriers' Ass'n v. MacMullan, 406 U.S. 498, 510 (1972) (quoting Zwickler v. Koota, 389
U.S. 241, 248 (1967)); Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228, 234-36 (1943); Cary, 44
U.S. (3 How.) at 245; Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 789-90 (D.D.C.
1984) (per curiam) (Edwards, J., concurring), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1354 (1985); Redish
I, supra note 7, at 112-13; Pending State Court Suits, supra note 10, at 687. But see
Bezanson, supra note 20, at 1107 (Supreme Court has assumed the power to allocate
jurisdiction).
68. See Redish I, supra note 7, at 113. Redish argues that a congressional provision
for jurisdiction must be more than simply an option for the federal court to act. This
contention is based on the belief that Congress could not have intended to vest the federal
judiciary with the power to disregard a particular federal statute. Id. The argument can
be taken a step further: The framers themselves did not intend that the judiciary be
vested with the power to ignore jurisdictional statutes. Congress' power to allocate juris-
diction, as well as its power to overrule the courts by constitutional amendment, were the
major legislative checks on the judiciary. Accordingly, the Constitution obliges a federal
court to adhere to the allocation of jurisdiction by a coordinate branch of the federal
government-the legislature. See Pacemaker Diagnostic Clinic of Am. v. Instromedix,
Inc., 725 F.2d 537, 544-45 (9th Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 100 (1984).
Article III is one of the provisions of the Constitution that delineates the separation of
powers among the branches of government. Two sections of article III are relevant to a
court's duty to exercise its jurisdiction. The first grants Congress the power to create,
define and distribute the jurisdiction of the federal courts, see U.S. Const. art. III, § 1, as
a check against the power of the judiciary, see Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U.S. 182, 187
(1943); Cary v. Curtis, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 235, 245 (1845); C. Wright I, supra note 1, § 7,
at 23. The second, which requires that article III judges have permanent office and a
right to undiminished compensation, see U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, was intended to pre-
serve the independence and impartiality of the judiciary, see Northern Pipeline Constr.
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"could be characterized as a judicial usurpation" 9 because the task of
defining and distributing federal jurisdiction "must be ... the work of
the legislature,"7 not the judiciary.71
B. The Res Judicata Factor
Despite the fact that the Colorado River stay procedure effectively
amounts to a dismissal of the federal action,72 the lower federal courts
have not attempted to identify congressional authority, express or im-
plied, when they have utilized this procedure.73 Furthermore, there has
been no effort to temper res judicata principles to permit a plaintiff to
return to federal court following the conclusion of the state action. 74 Ac-
cordingly, preclusion should also be considered when determining
whether a stay is appropriate."
The Supreme Court has considered the impact of res judicata princi-
ples in the context of a Colorado River stay. In Moses H. Cone the Court
rejected the argument that abstention was appropriate when jurisdiction
was stayed rather than dismissed.76 The Court recognized that "a stay is
as much a refusal to exercise federal jurisdiction as a dismissal," 7 be-
cause "the state court's judgment on the issue would be res judicata."'7"
Unfortunately, the Court did not declare this concern to be an additional
factor.79 There is reason, based upon Supreme Court precedent, how-
Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 58-60,judgment stayed, 459 U.S. 813 (1982);
United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 217-21 (1980); The Federalist No. 78 (A. Hamilton)
(rev. ed. 1901).
Separation of powers has two components: One encompasses the relationship of indi-
viduals to a government branch, and the other runs among the governmental branches to
ensure separation and independence in the constitutional structure. Pacemaker Diagnos-
tic Clinic, 725 F.2d at 541; Chadha v. INS, 634 F.2d 408, 422, 431 (9th Cir. 1980), aff'd,
462 U.S. 919 (1985). "Where a case is transferred. . . from an Article III court to a
different forum, both the right of the parties and the relations between the separate
branches of the government are implicated." Pacemaker Diagnostic Clinic, 725 F.2d at
541; see England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 415 (1964);
Willcox v. Consolidated Gas Co., 212 U.S. 19, 40 (1909) (citing Cohens v. Virginia, 19
U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821)); Redish I, supra note 7, at 112; Pending State Court
Suits, supra note 10, at 687, 688 & n.28.
69. Redish I, supra note 7, at 76.
70. Cary v. Curtis, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 236, 245 (1845).
71. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
72. See supra note 6 and infra notes 76-78 and accompanying text.
73. See supra notes 11, 24-26, 41 and accompanying text.
74. See infra note 105 and accompanying text.
75. See infra notes 80-92 and accompanying text.
76. See 460 U.S. 1, 28 (1983).
77. Id.
78. Id. at 10.
79. The Court did, however, reject the contention that a stay order could not be ap-
pealed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1982). See Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 10. Section
1291 provides in relevant part: "The courts of appeals. . . shall have jurisdiction of
appeals from all final decisions of the district courts.. . ..." The Court ruled that a stay
order is "final" because the plaintiff is effectively deprived of access to the federal forum
due to the preclusive effect that must be given to state court judgments. See Moses H.
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ever, to modify this approach.
When claims are within the exclusive jurisdiction of a federal court,
the preclusive effect of a state court judgment requires that a stay be
denied.8" Preclusion is important in the context of concurrent jurisdic-
tion as well. In Moses H. Cone the Court denied a stay, 81 explaining that
even when jurisdiction is concurrent with that of the state court, the
mere "presence of federal-law issues must always be a major considera-
tion weighing against surrender [of jurisdiction]." 2 The prospect of
granting a stay when a federal suit would later be barred was clearly
offensive to the Court. 3
Cone, 460 U.S. at 10. In the alternative, the Court ruled that a stay order also falls within
the exception to the finality rule recognized in Cohen v. Beneficial Loan Corp., 337 U.S.
541 (1949), in that it conclusively determined the question whether federal jurisdiction
should be exercised, it resolved an issue separate from the merits of the action, and it was
effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment. See Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at
11-13. The Court's distaste for the res judicata effect of the anticipated state court judg-
ment was central to its holding that the stay was inappropriate. See id. at 10, 12 & n. 13,
27-28.
80. See Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 23-26.
(1983); Key v. Wise, 454 U.S. 1103, 1104 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari); Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 437 U.S. 655, 670, 674-75 (1978) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting); Kruse v. Snowshoe Co., 715 F.2d 120, 124 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104
S. Ct. 1413 (1984); Silberkleit v. Kantrowitz, 713 F.2d 433, 435-36 (9th Cir. 1983); Turf
Paradise, Inc. v. Arizona Downs, 670 F.2d 813, 821 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 456 U.S.
1011 (1982); JudicialAbstention, supra note 7, at 232-33. But see Classen v. Weller, 516
F. Supp. 1243, 1244-45 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (permitting a stay of exclusively federal claims).
In a recent decision, the Supreme Court explained that "a state judgment may in some
circumstances have preclusive effect in a subsequent action within the exclusive jurisdic-
tion of the federal courts." Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons,
105 S. Ct. 1327, 1332 (1985). It was clear to the Court that such a judgment could have
an issue preclusive effect, id., however, the Court stated that generally a state judgment
"will not have a claim preclusive effect on a cause of action within the exclusive jurisdic-
tion of the federal courts," id. at 1333, because "claim preclusion does not apply where
'the plaintiff was unable to rely on a certain theory of the case or to seek a certain remedy
because of the limitations on the subject matter jurisdiction of the courts.'" Id. (quoting
Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 26(1)(c) (1982)). The possibility of issue preclusion
alone, however, is sufficient to warrant the denial of a stay of a claim within the court's
exclusive jurisdiction. Additionally, the Court noted that an exclusively federal claim
may be barred by a state court judgment "if application of state preclusion law suggests
that the [judgment] bars the subsequent federal claim and if there is no exception to
§ 1738 in [the] circumstances." 105 S. Ct. at 1333 n.2. This possibility also should war-
rant the denial of a stay of an exclusively federal claim.
81. See 460 U.S. 1, 19 (1983).
82. Id. at 26.
83. See id. at 10, 12 & n.13, 27-28. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
Although the Court did not pronounce its res judicata concern as a factor, it did consider
the doctrine substantively. The hospital had argued that the Colorado River test was
inapplicable because the federal action in Moses H. Cone was merely stayed, not dis-
missed. See id. at 27. The Court rejected this argument, refusing to condone an arrange-
ment in which a state court judgment would surely be pleaded as res judicata in the
federal action. See id. at 23, 27-28. A stay having such a res judicata effect would be
permissible only when an affirmative congressional policy favoring abstention could be
identified, id. at 23 n.29, or in rare circumstances when the presence of state law issues
counsels for the dismissal of federal jurisdiction, id. at 23 & n.29, 25-26. The Court ac-
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The Supreme Court has given res judicata an expansive interpreta-
tion.84 The harshness of the res judicata doctrine is not the result of a
"practice or procedure inherited from a more technical [era]. It is a rule
of fundamental and substantial justice, 'of public policy and of private
peace,' which should be cordially regarded and enforced by the
courts."85 The rule is not a technical formulation to be balanced against
other public policies; it is the balance of public policy.86 Res judicata
encompasses the interests of finality, conserving judicial resources,
preventing burdensome relitigation, 7 and, in the context of section
1738,88 promoting federalism and comity. 9 The justifications for a stay
of jurisdiction in deference to a parallel state suit are the same: The pro-
cedure frees litigants and courts from the burden of duplicative litiga-
tion9" and avoids friction between the state and federal judiciaries.9 The
res judicata doctrine, however, does not operate until a judgment has
been rendered by a court;9 2 it presupposes a system in which litigants are
free to sue at the time and in the forum of their choice.93 A federal court
knowledged that res judicata is not to be part of the solution to the inefficiency of duplica-
tive litigation but is a factor which must be justified by the presence of exceptional
circumstances-congressional authority. See id. A court should consider in its decision
to stay a case whether the state court will in effect decide the entire dispute, because a
judgment there will preclude a party from returning to federal court. Federman v. Em-
pire Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 597 F.2d 798, 808 & n.15 (2d Cir. 1979); Amdur v. Lizars,
372 F.2d 103, 105-06 (4th Cir. 1967); C. Wright I, supra note 1, at 317-18. This consider-
ation should put a court on notice that a dismissal is truly the exceptional case and must
be carefully justified in light of the court's obligation to its governmental counterpart-
the legislature-and to plaintiffs seeking to sue in federal court.
84. See Marrese v. Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 105 S. Ct. 1327 (1985); Migra
v. Warren City School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 104 S. CL 892 (1984); Kremer v. Chemical
Constr. Corp. 456 U.S. 461 (1982); Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394
(1981); Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980); Reed v. Allen, 286 U.S. 191, (1932).
85. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 401 (1981) (quoting Hart
Steel Co. v. Railroad Supply Co., 244 U.S. 294, 299 (1917)).
86. See id.; 1B J. Moore, supra note 14, 0.405[11], at 259.
87. Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 466 n.6 (1982); Montana v.
United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153-54 (1979); Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183, 192-93
(1947); 1B J. Moore, supra note 14, 0.405111], at 259.
88. See supra note 13.
89. Migra v. Warren City School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 104 S. CL 892, 898 (1984);
Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461,466 n.6 (1982); Allen v. McCurry, 449
U.S. 90, 95-96 (1980).
90. See Reichman v. Pittsburgh Nat'l Bank, 465 F.2d 16, 18 (3d Cir. 1972); Aetna
State Bank v. Altheimer, 430 F.2d 750, 755, 758 (7th Cir. 1970); Amdur v. Lizars, 372
F.2d 103, 107-08 (4th Cir. 1967); The Impact of Colorado River, supra note 9, at 641;
Judicial Abstention, supra note 7, at 227.
91. See Schwartz v. Judicial Retirement Sys. of NJ., 584 F. Supp. 711, 717 (D.NJ.
1984); Dione v. Bowley, 583 F. Supp. 307, 311 (D.R.I. 1984), aff'd as modified, No. 84-
1258, slip op. (Mar. 19, 1985); Chemical Bank v. City of Bandon, 562 F. Supp. 704, 706
(D. Or. 1983).
92. 1B J. Moore, supra note 14, 0.404[1-1], at 301.
93. See Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 401-02 (1981) (quoting
Reed v. Allen, 286 U.S. 191, 198-99 (1932)); see also England v. Louisiana State Bd. of
Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 415 (1964) (application of res judicata when plaintiff
has been forced to litigate in state court is offensive to notion that litigants are free to sue
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should not, in the context of a stay-in other words, before a judgment
triggers res judicata considerations-use these same policy justifications
prospectively to bar a plaintiff from litigating in a federal forum.94 Ac-
cordingly, a federal court disrupts the balance that is res judicata when,
in the interest of judicial efficiency, it relegates a plaintiff to a state
court.9"
Recognition of the true nature of res judicata will not always counsel
against a stay. 96 Abstention has been permitted either when congres-
sional authority warranting a dismissal of federal jurisdiction can be im-
plied97 or when the abdication of jurisdiction can be avoided through the
tempering of res judicata principles. 98 A federal court should identify
such authority or develop a similar procedure before granting a stay in
deference to a similar state proceeding which will inevitably result in a
plea of res judicata to dispose of the federal action. 99
Utilizing the res judicata factor to permit fewer stays will result in the
pendency of similar proceedings in state and federal court. While this
in forum of their choice); Key v. Wise, 454 U.S. 1103, 1106-07 (1981) (Brennan, J., dis-
senting to denial of certiorari) (same).
94. See supra notes 14, 92 and accompanying text. Res judicata is not operative until
a judgment is rendered in one forum, while a stay operates to bar litigation in the federal
forum prospectively.
95. Arguably a plaintiff is not forced to litigate in state court if he has voluntarily
brought the state action as well as the federal action. See The Impact of Colorado River,
supra note 9, at 666. However, there are tactical reasons for bringing the multiple ac-
tions, see id. at 648; Vairo, supra note 61, at 22, col. 2, and the federal plaintiff should not
be deprived of such stategic opportunities when Congress has guaranteed access to a
federal forum.
96. Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe, 463 U.S. 545, 567 (1983). The Supreme
Court in San Carlos applied the res judicata factor in the context of concurrent jurisdic-
tion and concluded that the factor counselled for a stay. The Court stated:
Since a judgment by either court would ordinarily be res judicata in the other,
the existence of such concurrent proceedings creates the serious potential for
spawning an unseemly and destructive race to see which forum can resolve the
same issues first-a race contrary to the entire spirit of the McCarran
Amendment ...
Id. at 567. The Court's concern for res judicata focused the Court's attention on the
congressional policies inherent in the jurisdictional statutes. It is doubtful that the res
judicata factor would have counselled for a stay in the absence of such a clear congres-
sional policy as that inherent in the McCarran Amendment.
97. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
98. See infra note 105 and accompanying text.
99. See Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe, 463 U.S. 545, 567 (1983) (permits stay
after concluding res judicata factor lies within spirit of congressional policy in McCarran
Amendment); Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 28
(1983) (res judicata factor is important where there is any doubt that state court is ade-
quate for complete and prompt resolution of the dispute); Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co.,
437 U.S. 655, 674-76 (1978) (plurality opinion) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (discussion of
possible res judicata or collateral estoppel effects state court judgment would have on
federal claims is necessary); Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States,
424 U.S. 800, 819 (1976) (congressional authority permitted ignoring res judicata
principles).
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result may be viewed as inefficient and burdensome,100 a court's interest
in maintaining its proper role within the constitutional scheme of govern-
ment overrides these concerns.101 In any case, the problems inherent in
duplicative litigation can be addressed in a number of other ways.
When federal jurisdiction is concurrent with that of the state court, the
federal court can deny a stay and permit the litigants to pursue their
claims in both forums until a judgment in one can be used to preclude the
other action. 0 2 While res judicata may not promote the same degree of
judicial efficiency as the stay procedure, it does not force the parties to
litigate only in state court.103 The court also could abstain and apply the
Pullman procedure,"°4 which allows the plaintiff to reserve his federal
claims for adjudication upon his return to federal court. 5 Finally, the
federal court may request the state tribunal to stay its proceedings pend-
100. Mottolese v. Kaufman, 176 F.2d 301, 303 (2d Cir. 1949); see P. Beiersdorf & Co.
v. McGohey, 187 F.2d 14, 15 (2d Cir. 1951) (relying on Mottolese); Redish I, s'apra note
7, at 97; cf. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966) (pendent jurisdic-
tion permitting a federal court to hear related claims not within its jurisdiction rests on
notions of efficiency of hearing all claims in one proceeding); Surman v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 733 F.2d 59, 63 (8th Cir. 1984) (might be more efficient to try
related claims in one proceeding).
101. See supra notes 62-70 and accompanying text. See Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co.,
437 U.S. 655, 675 (1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (obligation to exercise jurisdiction
outweighs efficiency concerns); Redish I, supra note 7, at 97.
102. See Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817
(1976); United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394, 1402 n.6 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104
S. Ct. 3536 (1984); Evans v. Tubbe, 657 F.2d 661, 665 & n.7 (5th Cir. 1981); Johnson v.
American Credit Co., 581 F.2d 526, 530 (4th Cir. 1978); Jennings v. Boenning & Co., 482
F.2d 1128, 1132 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1025 (1973); cf. Surman v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 733 F.2d 59, 63 (8th Cir. 1984) (might be more efficient
to try related claims in one proceeding but federal law may force parties to resolve dis-
putes in separate forums-arbitration and federal court); Silberkleit v. Kantrowitz, 713
F.2d. 433, 435 n.2 (9th Cir. 1983) (consider only federal claims).
Permitting two similar actions to proceed concurrently may encourage a race to judg-
ment and stall tactics. See Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe, 463 U.S. 545, 567-68
(1983). However, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure can be used effectively to prevent
the stalling of the federal action. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 (court may impose sanctions for
pleadings which are interposed for delay); Fed. R. Civ. P. 16 (court has control of pre-
trial procedure and can schedule time limits); Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(d), (f), 37, 41 (court
may control ongoing discovery).
103. Application of res judicata does not occur until after a judgment is reached in one
forum. The doctrine, therefore, does not prevent a party from litigating his claim in the
forum of his choice. See Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 401-02
(1981) (court will not interfere when res judicata is invoked against a party because the
situation is due to the party's own making) (quoting Reed v. Allen, 286 U.S. 191, 198-99
(1932)); see also Kerotest Mfg. Co. v. C-O-Two Fire Equip. Co., 342 U.S. 180, 185 (1952)
(right to federal forum ensures equal start in race to the courthouse, not head start).
104. Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
105. See American Trial Lawyers Ass'n v. New Jersey Sup. Ct., 409 U.S. 467, 469 &
n.4 (1973); England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 417-18
(1964); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 427 (1963); see also Key v. Wise, 454 U.S. 1103,
1107-08 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (explaining the Pullman
procedure in the context of a Colorado River stay). See generally Brown v. Felsen, 442
U.S. 127, 132 (1979) (res judicata principles should be tempered to achieve justice); Mer-
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ing a judgment in the federal court.1"6 State courts have been willing to
consider such a stay,10 7 and the Supreme Court has indicated its ap-
proval of this procedure, stating that "[c]ertainly, the federal courts need
not defer to the state proceedings if the state courts expressly agree to
stay their own consideration of the issues raised in the federal action
pending disposition of that action."' '
A court's interest in exercising its jurisdiction is strongest when Con-
gress has conferred exclusive jurisdiction.'0 9 The potential that a stay of
an exclusively federal claim will amount to a dismissal due to the preclu-
sive effect of a state court judgment110 is particularly offensive when Con-
gress has designated the federal court as the only appropriate forum."
coid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661, 670 (1944) (same); Reed v. Allen,
286 U.S. 191, 209 (1932) (Cardozo, J., dissenting) (same).
The Pullman procedure would not always be helpful because often the similar pending
state and federal actions involve state law issues, and there would therefore be no federal
question claims to reserve for a return to federal court. See Roberts & Schaefer Co. v.
Lake Coal Co., No. 83-5551, slip op. at 4 (6th Cir. Nov. 20, 1984), cert. granted, 105 S.
Ct. 1841 (1985); Vairo, supra note 61, at 27, col 2. In addition the Pullman procedure has
not been used when the state court has stated that it will not hear the case while the
federal case is stayed because the state court would then be rendering only an advisory
opinion. See Harris County Comm'rs v. Moore, 420 U.S. 77, 88-89 & n.14 (1975); Ro-
mero v. Coldwell, 455 F.2d 1163, 1167 (5th Cir. 1972).
106. See Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe, 463 U.S. 545, 569 (1983); United States
v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394, 1402 n.6, 1405-06 & n.II (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct.
3536 (1984); cf. Lake Communications, Inc. v. ICC Corp., 738 F.2d 1473, 1479 (9th Cir.
1984) (proceed with antitrust claims while arbitrable claims are stayed pending
arbitration).
107. See Clark's Fork Reclamation Dist. No. 2069 v. Johns, 259 Cal. App. 2d 366,
369-71, 66 Cal. Rptr. 370, 372-73 (1968); Bressler v. Bressler, 155 A.2d 255, 256 (D.C.
Mun. App. 1959); Lawyers Professional Liab. Ins. Co. v. Shand, Morahan & Co., 394 So.
2d 238, 240 (Fla. App. 1981); Consumers' Power Co. v. Michigan Pub. Utils. Comm'n,
270 Mich. 213, 218, 258 N.W. 250, 252 (1935); Reliance Ins. Co. v. Tiger Int'l, Inc., 91
A.D.2d 925, 925-26, 457 N.Y.S.2d 813, 814 (1983); Kwiatkowski v. National Student
Mktg. Corp., 85 A.D.2d 559, 560, 445 N.Y.S.2d 703, 704 (1981); cf. State ex rel. Camp-
bell v. Svetanics, 548 S.W.2d 293, 294-95 (Mo. App. 1977) (discussing power but declin-
ing to exercise it).
108. Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe, 463 U.S. 545, 569 (1983).
109. See Key v. Wise, 454 U.S. 1103, 1103-04 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari); Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 437 U.S. 655, 670 (1978) (plurality
opinion) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Kaholokula v. Hula Records, Inc., 746 F.2d 583, 585
(9th Cir. 1984); Judicial Abstention, supra note 7, at 231-33; see also Moses H. Cone
Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 23-26 (1983) (existence of strong
federal claim may raise threshold of justification for abstention); Colorado River Water
Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 815 n.21 (1976) (same); Schwartz v.
Judicial Retirement Sys., 584 F. Supp. 711, 719 (D.N.J. 1984) (same).
110. Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 105 S. Ct. 1327, 133 1-
35 (1985); see Nash County Bd. of Educ. v. Biltmore Corp., 640 F.2d 484, 487-92 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 878 (1981); cf. Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Co., 456 U.S.
461, 476, 479 & n.20 (1982) (state judgment given preclusive effect; Court does not deter-
mine whether Title VII grants federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over claims). See
supra note 80.
111. See Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 23-26
(1983) (when federal law provides rule of decision stay ordinarily should be denied); Key
v. Wise, 454 U.S. 1103, 1103-05 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari)
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Indeed, the presence of a duplicative state proceeding is a threat to fed-
eral jurisdiction.'" 2 For example, it has been held that a state court adju-
dication of state antitrust claims may preclude an action in federal court
concerning the exclusively federal antitrust laws.' 13
A court in such instance may elect to couple the denial of abstention
with a request that the state court stay its proceedings "4 or with an in-
junction of the state proceedings pending the conclusion of the federal
action."1 Although Congress has restricted the use of such an injunc-
tion,"1 6 a federal court may enjoin state proceedings when "necessary in
aid of its jurisdiction." ' 7 Case law, however, presently defines this ex-
ception narrowly. 8 Injunctions are permitted when a federal and a
state court have assumed jurisdiction over the same res,'"9 but this excep-
tion has not been extended to permit injunctions of an in personam state
(when claim is within exclusive jurisdiction stay should be denied); Will v. Calvert Fire
Ins. Co., 437 U.S. 655, 670 (1978) (Brennan, I., dissenting from a 4-1-4 plurality opinion)
(same); Kaholokula v. Hula Records, Inc., 746 F.2d 583, 585 (9th Cir. 1984) (same);
Judicial Abstention, supra note 7, at 231-33 (same). But see Classen v. Weller, 516 F.
Supp. 1243, 1244-45 (N.D. Cal. 1980) (permitting stay of exclusively federal claim).
112. Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 105 S. Ct. 1327, 1332
(1985); Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 437 U.S. 655, 674-76 (1978) (plurality opinion)
(Brennan, J., dissenting); Capital Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 501, 504 (1954); Key v.
Wise, 629 F.2d 1049, 1061-63 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1103 (1981); Coder
v. Inter-County Orthopaedic Ass'n, 526 F.2d 537, 542 (3d Cir. 1975); Lyons v. Westing-
house Elec. Corp., 222 F.2d 184, 189 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 825 (1955); see
Redish, The Anti-Injunction Statute Reconsidered, 44 U. Chi. L Rev. 717, 753 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as Redish II].
113. Nash County Bd. of Educ. v. Biltmore Co., 640 F.2d 484, 488-93 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 878 (1981); Key v. Wise, 629 F.2d 1049, 1064-68 (5th Cir. 1980), cert
denied, 454 U.S. 1103 (1981). But see Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic
Surgeons, 105 S. Ct. 1327, 1333 (1985) (while a state court judgment may have issue
preclusive effect in a subsequent exclusive federal action, it ordinarily will not have a
claim preclusive effect because the state court would not have had subject matter jurisdic-
tion to hear the exclusive federal claim).
114. See supra notes 106-08 and accompanying text.
115. Capital Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 501, 504 (1954); see Redish H, supra note
112, at 753-60. The Court in Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp.,
460 U.S. 1 (1983), reserved the question whether a federal court may enjoin a state pro-
ceeding that threatens the exercise of its jurisdiction. See id. at 25 n.32.
116. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1982) provides: "A court of the United States may not grant
an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of
Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judg-
ments." Id.
117. Id.
118. See Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, 398 U.S. 281,
297 (1970); Alton Box Bd. Co. v. Espirit De Corp., 682 F.2d 1267, 1272 (9th Cir. 1982);
Cleaver v. Wilcox, 499 F.2d 940, 943 (9th Cir. 1974); Jennings v. Boenning & Co., 482
F.2d 1128, 1132-33 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1025 (1973); Heyman v. Kline, 456
F.2d 123, 131-32 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 847 (1972); Robertson v. Interstate Sec.
Co., 435 F.2d 784, 786 (8th Cir. 1971); T. Smith & Son, Inc. v. Williams, 275 F.2d 397,
407 (5th Cir. 1960); Companion Life Ins. Co. v. Matthews, 547 F. Supp. 836, 838-39
(S.D.N.Y. 1982); Inmates of Middlesex County v. Demos, 519 F. Supp. 770, 772 (D.NJ.
1981).
119. See Vendo Co. v. Lektro-Vend Corp., 433 U.S. 623, 641 (1977); Atlantic Coast




When the federal action is within a court's exclusive jurisdiction, a
more expansive interpretation of this exception is appropriate. Res judi-
cata principles indicate that the refusal of a state court to relinquish juris-
diction when a similar federal action is pending can effectively destroy
the federal court's exclusive jurisdiction if the state court renders a judg-
ment first.12' A federal court wishing to avoid duplicative litigation of an
exclusively federal claim should not be forced to stay the federal suit. It
is more appropriate for the court to retain jurisdiction and enjoin the
state proceeding.
CONCLUSION
The manner in which lower federal courts have applied the Colorado
River abstention doctrine offends the narrow holding of that case and
compromises the constitutional role of the federal judiciary. The pen-
dency of a similar action in state court warrants no exception to a federal
court's obligation to exercise its jurisdiction. Efficiency concerns alone
are not sufficiently exceptional for a court to decline the exercise of its
jurisdiction. Absent exceptional circumstances, separation of powers re-
New York Life Ins. Co., 314 U.S. 118 134-35 (1941); In re Glenn W. Turner Enters.
Litig., 521 F.2d 775, 780 (3d Cir. 1975).
120. Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226, 230 (1922); see Atlantic Coast Line
R.R. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, 398 U.S. 281, 295-96 (1970); Carter v. Ogden
Corp., 524 F.2d 74, 76 (5th Cir. 1975); Heyman v. Kline, 456 F.2d 123, 131 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 847 (1972); Hyde Constr. Co. v. Koehring Co., 388 F.2d 501, 508-
09 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 905 (1968). The reviser's note to 28 U.S.C. § 2283
states that the "in aid of its jurisdiction" exception was intended "to make clear the
recognized power of the Federal courts to stay proceedings in State cases removed to the
district courts." 28 U.S.C. § 2283 reviser's note (1970). The removal exception, however,
had already been held to constitute an "expressly authorized" exception codified by Con-
gress. See 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1970); Dietzsch v. Huidekoper, 103 U.S. 494, 497-98 (1880);
French v. Hay, 89 U.S. (22 Wall.) 250, 252-53 (1874). Because § 2283 codified pre-ex-
isting case law, including the removal exception, the "in aid of its jurisdiction" would be
superfluous if its only purpose was to allow federal stays of removed state cases. Redish
II, supra note 112, at 744. Indeed the federal courts have interpreted the exception more
liberally to include the res exception, which permits a federal court to enjoin state pro-
ceedings to prevent the state court from interfering with the federal court's jurisdiction
over a res. See Currie, The Federal Courts and the American Law Institute-Part 11, 36
U. Chi. L. Rev. 268, 323 (1969). See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
121. See Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 105 S. Ct. 1327,
1333 n.2 (1985); Key v. Wise, 454 U.S. 1103, 1107-08 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari); Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 437 U.S. 655, 669-70 (1978)
(Brennan, J., dissenting); Key v. Wise, 629 F.2d 1049, 1064-68 (5th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 1103 (1981); Currie, supra note 120, at 324. The question whether a
federal court may enjoin state proceedings to prevent the potential preclusive effect a
judgment emanating from that state court may have in a later federal action was reserved
in Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 25 n.32
(1982). The Supreme Court's narrow reading of § 2283, however, was in the context of
concurrent jurisdiction. See Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive
Eng'rs, 398 U.S. 281, 283-84 (1970). Arguably the need for an injunction is greater and
its harmful effects are minimized when claims are within the federal court's exclusive
jurisdiction.
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quires a federal court to hear all cases in which its jurisdiction is properly
invoked.
Federal courts must consider the fact that staying a federal case in
deference to concurrent state proceedings effectively bars access to a fed-
eral forum due to the preclusive effect of state court judgments. The
policies a stay is said to serve do not support the prospective barring of
access to a federal court. Only when express or implied congressional
policies mandate this result should a federal court issue a stay. Other-
wise, courts must permit litigants to sue when and where they choose.
David J. McCarthy

